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Abstract 
This paper uses, as its starting point, the argument that integration presupposes reciprocity. On the 
basis of secondary qualitative data analysis, the paper examines reintegration practices in post-Soviet 
countries where the State is said to be a weak provider of integration. The purpose is to explore inter-
regional differences and major critical issues in existing reintegration practices. To achieve this, the 
paper looks at the expectations to integration held by the European Commission, evaluates the 
reintegration practices in the former Soviet Union against the EU standards, and makes intra-regional 
comparisons based on the EU standards. Placing Georgia and Ukraine at the low extreme across the 
reintegration continuum, the constructed Reintegration Barometer locates the best reintegration 
country of Armenia halfway far from the theoretical/utopian ideal of the European Union. 
 
Introduction: What is (re)integration?  
Integration is basically viewed as ‘the process of mutual adaptation between host society and 
migrant…implying a sense of mutual obligation and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants 
and their host communities to a common purpose’ (IOM 2011: 51). As the International Organization 
of Migration recognizes, the responsibility for the success of integration rests not only on the migrant 
and but also on the accepting society, including the state, various institutions and local communities 
(ibid). The European Commission further stresses that, while actively participating in the integration 
process, the migrant must not be forced to lose his/her intrinsic self-identification (Commission 2003). 
Defining integration as ‘a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants 
and residents of Member States’ and placing this definition as the first Common Basic Principle of EU 
integration (CBP1), the Council of the European Union, thus acknowledges reciprocity as a pre-
requisite for integration (Council 2004).1
As shown in literatures and as summarized in Appendix A, integration means a complex variety of 
practices, all inter-connected by the rhetoric of reciprocity, which must be shaped by the active role of 
the state, if in the ideal terms (Biles et al. 2008; Penninx & Martiniello 2004; Zincone 2006). When there 
is no reciprocity, there is no state as a strong actor of integration. However, when the role of the state is 
weak, does it mean that there is no reciprocity and consequently there is no integration? Research 
recognizes alternative mechanisms of promoting the reciprocity between the migrant and society and 
consequently the integration (Anghel 2012; Bleahu 2004; Boyd 1989; Burawoy 200; Faist 2000). 
 Underpinning the rationale for the rest of the EU 10 
Common Basic Principles, reciprocity is therefore what makes the integration different from other 
adaptation processes such as assimilation, separation or rejection (Segal 2012). 
When taking into consideration complex migration trajectories, integration may involve more than 
one round of settlement and adaptation – including, for example, the round of reintegration. 
Reintegration can thus be understood as revised integration (or integration on new terms), which is to 
be implemented with respect to the mentioned EU principles. Otherwise, there is a risk of 
misunderstanding reintegration. 
The overall work of Jean-Pierre Cassarino demonstrates that reintegration is not merely a return to 
the first or historical homeland. It is a return with the ability to stay and proliferate. Reintegration can 
be therefore understood as revised communication between the migrant and the civil society, mediated 
by the state or by other (alternative) mechanisms. 
Cassarino (2004, 2008) further shows that the specificity of this revision (compared, for example, 
with the integration of immigrants) is that it should relate to the migratory history and consider the 
migration cycle. A strong variable in reintegration, the prior emigration experience should become an 
essential part of the reintegration policy discourse. In this respect, it is important to differentiate 
between reintegration of returnees and integration of immigrants. For returnees, reintegration is the 
continuation (or the end) of their migration cycle, during which they might have accumulated some 
integration (skill-transferability) capital; whereas for immigrants, integration is the beginning of their 
migratory cycle within the context of the receiving society.2
 
 Therefore, policy makers and those who 
write policy reports should clearly differentiate between the categories of “returnee” and “immigrant” 
(under which the majority of so-called repatriates would probably fall). 
                                                     
1 For the summary of EU CBPs and their basic characteristics, see Appendix A. 
2 In his most recent research, Cassarino (2008) points to the complexity of migration cycles. In this connection, it is 
legitimate to say that the migration cycle of a circular or serial migrant may consist of several mini-cycles, each 
associated with a particular country. 
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Thinking about the relationship between integration and reintegration, Segal (2010) notes that if the 
state cannot appropriately accommodate its own citizens who are returning home, it will most likely 
also have difficulties supporting a successful integration of immigrants. That is why reintegration is 
currently being placed on the research and policy agenda as a strategic prerogative and a way toward a 
multicultural society. 
Looking at migrant-sending post-Soviet states, policy analysts often observe that there is no 
centralized and consistent reintegration policy in these states (Badurashvili 2004, 2005, 2013; 
Chobanyan 2008, 2012; Makaryan 2012; Mansoor & Quillin 2007; Poghosyan 2007). This paper 
seeks to explore critical issues and problems of reintegration in four post-Soviet countries that 
accept their returnees in the conditions of so-called “stateless” reintegration. 
The post-Soviet case 
Independent studies point to a number of complexities within the post-Soviet migratory space 
(Brubaker 2001; Makaryan 2012; Rumyantzev 2011, 2012; Yunusov 2009, 2013). Due to the post-
Soviet emergence of “cataclysm diasporas” and vague regulation policies on migration (Mansoor & 
Quillin 2007), it is difficult to say exactly who migrates where, and whether the person enters a new 
country or returns home. Even the understanding of “home” as such has been substantially re-shaped 
since the Soviet collapse. Thus since the early 1990s, the post-Soviet migratory space has been very 
dynamic. However, little is known about post-Soviet migrants who return now either from the former 
Soviet republics or from overseas. Their migration streams are chaotic and uncontrollable (Cassarino 
2004, 2008). 
In our work, we would like to look at issues of reintegration in four post-Soviet states, namely: the 
South Caucasian countries of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan; and also Ukraine. We have chosen 
these countries because of their sociological relevant differences and commonalities. First, the three 
South Caucasian states have tangible differences in their integration policies (although the South 
Caucasian reintegration has been generally recognized as non-state-regulated). Thus Georgia can be 
placed at the low extreme along the reintegration provision continuum, while Azerbaijan claims to 
have successful reintegration practices and Armenia occupies a position somewhere in the middle. 
Second, they share such commonalities as a strong political turmoil due to ethnic conflicts and wars 
and a consequent inflow of undocumented refugees.  
Third, these three states (as well as Ukraine) have a historically shaped, strong cosmopolitan 
condition, illuminated either by relatively old diasporas [for Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine] or the 
cosmopolitan status of the (post)Soviet city of Baku. The South Caucasus, in particular, is known for 
strong co-ethnic networks supporting people. 
Fourth, the majority of the returnees to these four states often return from the same destination 
country – Russia – where they were assigned different status positions within the ethnic minority 
hierarchy. Thus people from Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia belong to the upper-low level (after 
migrants from Middle Asia). In Russia, they are viewed as too “visible” in the negative sense whereas 
Ukrainians are considered the “titular” Slavic ethnicity (Mukhomel 2011, 2012, 2013).3
 
 With respect 
to the interconnection between reintegration and migration cycle, this may have a strong impact upon 
reintegration practices (Cassarino 2004, 2008). 
                                                     
3 See also Connor (1993), Isaakyan (2008), Mitrokhin (2003) and Slezkine (2004) on the historical roots of the post-Soviet 
ethno-nationalism in Russia. 
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Finally, the case of Ukraine is also interesting because of its “European Mexico” status or leading 
position in EU migrant inflows (Duvell 2006). In addition, the majority of people returning to Ukraine 
and Georgia have been illegal immigrants in Russia or EU countries, and reintegration of illegal 
migrants is expected to be more challenging because of the trauma and unofficial credentials. 
Methodology 
Method and objectives 
This paper seeks to explore critical issues and problems of reintegration in four post-Soviet 
countries that accept their returnees in the conditions of so-called “stateless” reintegration. In order to 
explore the reintegration situation within the post-Soviet migratory space, we seek to achieve the 
following objectives:  
1. to look at the expectations to integration held by the European Commission;  
2. to evaluate the reintegration practices in the former Soviet Union against the EU standards; 
and 
3. to make intra-regional comparisons based on EU standards. 
To achieve all this, the method of secondary data analysis is used, with emphasis on qualitative 
re-examination of regional policy reports from South Caucasus and also on re-interpretation of 
Common Basic Principles of the European Commission. Since the 1990s, there has been a growing 
interest in the methodology of secondary analysis of qualitative data. According to Heaton (2000, 
2008), some categories of qualitative data [e.g.: such as life stories, sensitive narratives, or policy 
reports] may demand secondary analysis or a thorough re-examination. However, the secondary-
analysis-based qualitative revision is not the same as review of prior studies/reports because the latter 
does not require a substantial reworking of data and generation of new analytical units (ibid). 
Assessment 
The EU basic expectations to integration are generally formulated as the EU Eleven Common Basic 
Principles of Integration, or CBP 1-11. They may be understood as a theoretical ideal for integration 
and reintegration. Below is their brief analysis. 
The summary of EU CBP 1-11 and implications for assessment are presented in Figures 1 and 2. 
Although the EU indicators are to serve as guidelines for our understanding of (re)integration, 
“integration” is a nebulous concept per se: it has a number of components and ambiguities around the 
roles and responsibilities of the actors involved. That is why scholars and policy analysis of integration 
always have difficulties evaluating its outcomes, particularly given the complexities of the post-Soviet 
migratory space.  
Our assessment of reintegration in post-Soviet states is based on different degrees of agency (the role 
of a particular actor) and also on the quantity of criteria (as indicated by CBPs). According to the 
European Commission, the degrees of agency are not homogenous across the CBPs. Some areas of 
integration depend of migrants’ socio-demographic characteristics [e.g.: their migratory capital or ability 
to integrate] while others – solely on the state capacity to provide appropriate conditions for integration.  
Figure 3 graphically presents the summary of reintegration assessment in four post-Soviet states in 
relation to prevailing groups of the returning migrant: high-skill temporary labour migrants (Georgia, 
Armenia and Ukraine) and three distinct groups of migrant in Azerbaijan who are classified as 
“returnees” by the Azerbaijani government and policy analysts. These three groups predominantly 
include: (a) male Azerbaijani migrants from Russia and Ukraine (who left Azerbaijan many years 
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ago); (b) their Russian/Ukrainian dependents or family members; and (c) ethnic Azerbaijanis from 
Georgia (who had never lived in Azerbaijan before their repatriation). 
These prevailing groups and consequent reintegration country profiles are graphically presented in 
Figure 3 and analyzed on the basis of the discursive cohesion between the state policy discourse and 
the policy-analysis discourse. In some cases, the differentiation of such migrant groups results from 
policy cleavages, when the presence of an omitted migrant group is not considered to be statistically 
eminent [e.g.: labour migrants in Azerbaijan]. In others, it may be based on methodological pitfalls: 
when policy analysts who inform the state policy on integration obviously ignore the presence of 
certain groups.  
Each CBP requires one or two actors. These actors are: the migrant (indicated in the charts as “M”) 
and the society/state (both indicated in the charts as “S”). If the CBP requires only 1 actor, it is 
indicated in the charts as “M” or “S”, depending on whether this actor is the migrant or the 
society/state. Although the state and society are exactly synonymous in their integration-management 
roles, we still mark their presence with one letter “S” for the purposes of convenience. If the CBP 
requires both the migrant and the society, the actors are marked as “MS”. 
Apart from that, each CBP involves 1 or 2 criteria for assessment. Their presence is also indicated 
with the number “1” or “2”. For example, CBP1 requires the presence of both actors and therefore 
involves 2 criteria for assessment (when there are 2 actors, the indicator always involves 2 criteria – 
one for assessing the migrant’s role and one for assessing the role of the society). It is therefore 
marked as “MS2” [see Figures 1-2]. 
Another example is CBP11. It requires the presence of only one actor, which is the State and only 
one criterion for assessment – the effectiveness of state planning. It is therefore marked as “S1” [see 
Figures 1-2]. The State never liaisons with the migrant directly because it is the mediator between the 
migrant and the society. 
Except for the economic integration (CBP3), the CBPs have either 1 or 2 criteria for their 
assessment. The intensity of 1 criterion is assessed as:  
 “++” or “2” (everything is done according to the EU indicator);  
 “+” or “1” (something is done but there are some limitations); 
 “-“ or “-1” (almost nothing is done); and 
 “--” or “-2” (not only nothing is done but the situation is also worsened by negative public 
attitudes, leading to marginalization and rejection). 
The presence of the 2 criteria is assessed as: 
 “++” or “2” (everything is done according to the EU indicator, and both requirements for 
integration are in place); 
 “+-” or “0” (something is done: the 1st criterion is matched while the 2nd is not); 
 “-+” or “0” (something is done: the 2nd criterion is matched while the 1st is not) 
 “--” or “-2” (neither criterion is matched, leading to marginalization and rejection). 
The economic reintegration, it is assessed as based on the presence of the 4 criteria (employment, 
entrepreneurship, remittances and savings: 
 “++++” or “4” (all 4 criteria are present); 
 “----” or “-4” (all 4 criteria are absent); 
 “+-+-” or “0” (half of the criteria are present while the other half are not); etc. 
In our calculations, the presence of a certain criterion is marked as “+” and given 1 point. While the 
absence of a certain criterion is marked as “-” and given (-1) point. All points are then summarized 
[Figure 3, Blue Scores]. In the case of Azerbaijan, we calculate the mean score for its three diverse 
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migrant groups. Finally, convert all blue scores by adding (+20), in order to eliminate negative 
numbers and to construct the Reintegration Barometer [Figure 4]. 
Discussion of findings 
Integration Benchmarks  
CBP1 is the first and foremost principle of integration that should underpin the overall rationale for 
the integration of immigrants in any state. It says: “Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of 
mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.” Its basic meaning is 
reciprocity: integration is understood as a two-way process of mutual respect and adaptation between 
the migrant and society, mediated by the state.  
The other 10 principles are to conform to the general idea of reciprocity. Thus there are two actors 
involved in the realization of the reciprocity principle: the migrant (M) and the host society (S). There 
are two criteria of its effectiveness: the effort from the migrant and the effort from the society and/or 
the state. The effectiveness of this principle should be therefore assessed as based on the presence of 
these two criteria. In some areas of integration (like the one indicated in CBP1), the state may be 
synonymous with society, while in others (CBP10 and 11), the role of the state is more distinct from 
that of the society. 
In the majority of situations observed within the post-Soviet migratory space, the reciprocity is 
one-sided, when the returnee seeks to become part of the new society while the society rejects him/her. 
In Georgia and Ukraine, both the society and the returnee reject each other. As the data show, 
Georgian and Ukrainian returnees often have intentions to adjust to the life back home but later 
become more negative as they do not see any support from the society and therefore become 
demotivated. 
CBP 3/7 also demand the presence of two actors – the migrant and the society. CBP stresses the 
economic integration: “Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the 
participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making 
such contributions visible.” Appropriate employment (according to one’s qualifications) and public 
visibility of the migrant’s professionalism form the basis for understanding economic integration. 
For example, migrants may make efforts to apply for jobs whereas the society may be irresponsive 
by discriminating on the basis of nationality or by not recognizing foreign credentials, or by making 
the migrants’’ professional achievement “invisible.” Such delicate balance between employment 
and visibility make the economic integration a complex concept to understand and a complex 
practice to measure. 
In reference to reintegration, scholars further emphasize the importance of 4 criteria - rather than 
just one - in the assessment of appropriate job. Thus economically-reintegrated migrants are those 
who: (1) easily find adequate jobs upon their return; (2) easily engage in entrepreneurship upon their 
return; (3) send home remittances while abroad; and/or (4) make savings from their earnings abroad 
[see Figure 1]. 
The best economic reintegration is observed in Azerbaijan, where Azerbaijanis returning from 
Russia or Ukraine fulfill all four requirements: they come back with savings and remittances, buy 
property in Azerbaijan and either find lucrative jobs or engage in family businesses. A relatively 
positive case is found in Armenia, whose returnees do not bring back sufficient savings but do manage 
to economically support their families, to find jobs or engage in entrepreneurship upon return (much 
more frequently than returning Georgians or Ukrainians). In the majority of cases (illuminated by 
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijani dependent migrants and ethnic Azerbaijanis from Georgia), there are 
only remittances and there are no savings, adequate jobs or entrepreneurial activities.  
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CBP 7 stresses the responsibility of the migrant and the host society from the cultural perspective: 
“Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for 
integration. Shared forums, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, 
and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants 
and Member State citizens.” This indicator aims at achieving interaction between the migrant and the 
host society, resulting in the hosts’ knowledge about immigrants’ cultures. The effectiveness depends 
on the frequency and in-depth of this interaction. In many cases, migrants may become assimilated by 
rejected by the host society in terms of culture. 
The best situation of the mutual cultural reciprocity is found in Armenia, whose returnees show the 
strongest positive attitude to the host society, with whom they engage in a number of 
cultural/informational exchange activities, often monitored through foreign NGOs and administered 
on-line. The other cases are almost zero-interactive as neither the society nor the migrants want to 
interact and to learn about each other.  
CBP 2, 4, 5 and 9 presuppose the primary responsibility of the migrant in certain areas of cultural 
and political integration. It does not mean that the society is not involved – but the role of the migrant 
and his/her efforts play the crucial role. Thus CBP2 emphasizes that integration “implies respect for 
the basic values of the European Union” – that is, the migrant’s respect for the basic cultural values of 
the host country. In the majority of cases, the returnees show a relative degree of respect for host 
values, with which they do not however agree completely. In Georgia and Ukraine, the returnees 
strongly reject the values of their home societies in favor of more westernized attitudes. 
In continuation, CBP4 says that migrants should develop “basic knowledge of the host society’s 
language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this 
basic knowledge is essential to successful integration.” Thus they should seek to speak the national 
language and understand the host culture. The migrant’s linguistic and cultural competences are two 
basic criteria of assessing his/her integration in this area. Almost all returnees are native speakers who 
know the home culture very well either form the inside or from the inter-generational/diasporic 
perspective (like the case of ethnic Azerbaijanis from Georgia). However, long-absent returning 
Azerbaijanis are not familiar with the post-Soviet Azeri culture or with the post-Soviet culture of 
Baku. Neither may their wives and children know this culture and speak the national language. 
CBP5 stresses such an important aspect of both the cultural and economic integration as the 
educational integration of migrants and their children (with the inter-generational effect): “Efforts in 
education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more 
successful and more active participants in society”. On the one hand, migrants should be active in 
engaging in formal and informal education. But given certain difficulties of adult learning, the second 
(larger) accent is placed on the educational access and educational attainment of their children as 
second generation migrants. 
In Azerbaijan, which claims to have a relatively strong case of overall reintegration, the educational 
attainment of returnees and their children is the worst as they constantly evaluate the Azerbaijani 
educational system against the more advanced Russian/Ukrainian system. 
CBP9 emphasizes such two aspects of political integration as democratic participation and 
integration planning: “The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the 
formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their 
integration”. It is extremely difficult to migrant (who are newcomers in their host societies) to 
independently plan their own integration due to a variety of unwritten factors. That is why the 
prevailing situation within the post-Soviet space is the returnees’ inability to participate in democracy. 
However, democratic participation frequently takes place through grass-root activities such as family 
emancipation, change of a more liberal dressing style and lifestyle, or reconsideration of gender roles. 
Research shows that female migrants from traditional societies are usually more active in grass-root 
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democratic participation. Thus Ukrainian female labour-migrants often develop better relationships 
within their families back home, which is a form of democratic participation.  
Four other indicators (CBP 6, 8, 10 and 11) – point to the solar responsibility of the host society 
and/or the state for the success of integration. According to CPB6, “Access for immigrants to 
institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens 
and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration”. There is a uniform 
zero-access to institutions and services across post-Soviet states, which the majority of returnees 
complain about. They complain that the society keeps them unaware of repatriation programmes and 
social welfare services. Nor does it provide clear explanation about legal or other structural changes 
that took place in their absence. 
As CBP8 further states, “the practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other 
inviolable European rights or with national law”. The cultural diversity is absolutely denied in 
Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine, where the mass media often shape the image of the returning migrant 
as a dissident or an alien element. Because of the cosmopolitan reputation of Baku (where the majority 
of Azerbaijanis return), returning Azerbaijanis are given a certain degree of cultural freedom, except 
the situations of pressure from religion ceremonies or corruption. 
CBP 6 and 8 thus make the society responsible for the protection of cultural diversity and for the 
migrants’ access to services. Research shows that when the state is not present as another actor, 
alternative mechanisms (such as networks) may create practices of corruption and attitudes of 
xenophobia. 
The final two indicators recognize the leading role of the state in the success of integration. Thus 
the state is responsible for the governance (CBP10) and management/planning of integration (CBP11): 
“Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of 
government and public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and 
implementation (CBP10). Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are 
necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information 
more effective” (CBP11). All cases and migrant categories observed in this study point to a complete 
inability of the state to govern or plan reintegration. This is the most negatively uniform indicator 
within the post-Soviet migratory space, which allows us to conceptualize the post-Soviet reintegration 
as absolutely “stateless”. 
Theoretically, the state should be always present as it has the absolute power to interfere with the 
integration process and to set the overall national context for integration. In practice however, its 
involvement may be limited and replaced by institutions of the society. It is therefore de facto assumed 
that in certain areas of integration migrants themselves are responsible for their own adjustment. For 
example, some returning migrants may violate CBP2 and reject the basic values of the Azeri or 
Ukrainian culture; or the wives of Azeri returnees from Russia may refuse to speak the Azeri language 
(CBP4), or refuse to send their children to Azeri-speaking schools (CBP5). However, it would be 
simplistic to understand this opposition to integration only as contributed by the migrants’ prior 
culture (their socialization in Russia).  
If we look at the case of South Caucasian migrants in Russia (Mukhomel 2012), their children may 
refuse to speak Russian because they may have no cultural or educational resources to learn it. They may 
reject the Russian school system because the Russian school culture is very xenophobic. This factor is 
already within the competence of the Russian state, which indeed can but does nothing to change the 
situation. This goes beyond the scope of CBP5: this is already the violation of CBP 8, 10 and 11. 
Reintegration, in particular, shows a complex web of inter-influences, which can and must be 
governed by the state. For example, Ukraine does nothing about a large group of its returning labour 
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migrants while the press (which represents civil society) makes them extremely “visible” in the 
negative sense through the media counter-integration discourse. 
Georgia  
At present, the mass migration from Georgia is (1) recent, (2) homogenous and (3) informal-economy-
driven. Before the Soviet collapse, more than 95% of Georgian population led a sedative way of life, 
full-time residing in their republic. Facilitated by ethnic wars and later by the extended political and 
economic crisis, the mass emigration only started after the Soviet breakdown and suddenly turned 
Georgia into an express-human-capital-sender. 
The specificity of the economic and political development of Georgia compared with other post-
Soviet countries is that it has not yet completed its transition to the post-Soviet space. For its returning 
migrants, re-integration is therefore a transition to the emerging post-Soviet space. Culturally 
displaced and economically vulnerable, they actually return to the society that is also very unstable 
and disoriented. 
In this context, a new wave of economic migration has shaped over the last 10 years – temporary 
labour migration, leading predominantly to Russia and Southern Europe. Now this prevailing type of 
emigration has the status of “the national household strategy”, because it aims at sending remittances 
and making savings from overseas jobs to enable the economic survival of migrants’ families left in 
Georgia. People emigrate because they consider their emigration the only option available in order to 
survive economically. Thus the current emigration situation in Georgia can be summarized as 
necessity-labour-migration under the extreme conditions of economic hardships or the household-ad-
hoc-labour-migration. 
The majority of such labour migrants are highly educated people, who often leave Georgia for illegal 
low-skill work (often in the domestic work or construction sector) in Russia, Italy or Greece; and return 
2-3 years after. They are also circular migrants because, unable to find appropriate employment at home, 
they engage in another round of illegal re-emigration. Therefore, Georgia’s integration policy should 
primary seek to help returning illegal under-scaled migrants re-adjust back home. 
In spite of the economic hardships associated with illegal migration, emigration had made, 
however, the positive effect of gender empowerment on Georgian women (who constitute 30% of the 
migrant body). Playing the role of the breadwinner and the principal decision-maker while in 
emigration, they had a certain degree of economic independence such as living in a flat of one’s own 
and other conditions of the household comfort. For them, repatriation conveys a return to the 
traditional – now unpleasant - gender role-playing and financial dependence on the man, from which 
existing reintegration policies cannot protect them.  
Thus 92% of all returnees (including both women and men) are “unhappy with their return” and 
understand it as “involuntary” and caused by visa problems or family emergencies rather than the 
homeland call. As a result, they create their own “returnee networks” and connect with expatiate 
networks abroad in order “to alleviate the pain from their inability to re-integrate” and mostly in order 
to re-emigrate.  
Policy analysts admit that in practice the returnees’ socio-economic reintegration does not exist. 
Thus 80% of such returnees remain unemployed for a long time even despite their active job search. 
97% of them were not able to make savings in emigration because all the money from their overseas 
work was used to cover remittances for their families in Georgia. Only 3 % of the returnees were able 
to make savings and consequently to start their own business upon repatriation. Notwithstanding that 
returnees also feel sequestered from their families (with whom they reunify) and friends as well as 
from norms and values of Georgian society.  
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The statistical figures look even more miserable if to connect the reintegration project with a 
number of international programmes meant to support the reintegration. Thus only 1.3% of all 
returnees received the relocation support (including travel expenses and temporary housing) based on 
the readmission agreement between Georgia and the European Union. 0.5% managed to engage in 
entrepreneurship and only 0.07% could find a job within the framework of this initiative. The 
inefficiency of such international programmes is mostly explained in economic terms rather than in 
terms of informational access and civil society, emphasizing that the projects are too narrow-focused 
for the Georgian mass migration and repatriation. 
The policy-making discourse relates reintegration foremost to the economic development of the 
household, with a particular accent on remittances and entrepreneurship as major proxies. The economic 
reintegration discursively dominates: the rest of the reintegration problems are explained as dependent on 
the economic development of Georgia. Without denying their present inefficiency, the reintegration 
discourse nevertheless recognizes the institutions of family, networking and informal economy as 
alternative mechanisms of reintegration. The underlying rationale is that reintegration must be in place as 
long as the migrants’ connections are preserved and the economic development is facilitated. 
According to the statistical predictions, illegal labor migration will increase over the next years, 
becoming the main source of the household income in Georgia. That is why the Georgian government 
is not going to do anything to stop the pertuum mobile of its nationals, which was once created by the 
collapse of the Soviet system and the inability of the government to manage the situation. 
Ukraine 
The Georgian case strongly resonates with the situation in Ukraine in many directions. The Soviet 
collapse and especially the economic crisis had made Ukraine one of the top ten senders to Europe – 
“the European Mexico”. Due to the current crisis, many Ukrainian migrants return home so that 
Ukraine is facing the problem of their reintegration. 
Although the mainstream of returnees is very diverse in its composition as comprised of people 
who migrated in under different circumstances, the dominating returnee group is that of circulating 
labour migrants who left Ukraine not a long time ago for low-skill work in the EU. The mass circular 
migration and the mass illegal migration make respectively 80% and 95% of the overall Ukrainian 
migrant flows. Therefore, one of the biggest challenges for the Ukrainian state is the reintegration of 
returning labour migrants, which places Ukraine on the same scale with Georgia. 
The integration situation of the returnees remains very poor, almost on the null-level. They are 
reintegrated neither economically nor socio-culturally. There are absolutely no conditions for their 
reintegration to the national labour-market, with minimum rates of success in the private sector. Thus 
only 1/10 of the returnees engage in entrepreneurial activities. Like in Georgia, this labour migration 
only improves housing conditions but does not lead to any structural changes. 
Envisioning the perspectives of reintegration in the economic terms of a competitive national 
labour-market development, the state discourse uses the concept “re-inclusion” rather than 
“reintegration” as such, which leads to simplistic views on the reintegration problems. Thus the policy 
projects and the mass media stress the importance of the economic re-inclusion rather than the socio-
cultural reintegration, emphasizing the absolute dependence of the latter on the former and explaining 
the returnees’ inability to adjust to the local community and society as an outcome of their inability to 
find employment.  
Discourses also show a dogmatic understanding of the labour-migration phenomenon and fail to 
recognize that it has become a collective way of thinking and an existential condition rather than 
just a voluntary economic movement. A complete failure to recognize the importance of socio-
cultural reintegration is a key factor impeding the reintegration process and policy-making in both 
Ukraine and Georgia. 
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The chart in Figure 3 and the Reintegration Barometer in Figure 4 place Georgia and Ukraine both 
at the very low extreme of the reintegration continuum when assessed against the EU benchmarks. 
Apart from their remittances and the native knowledge of the language and culture, Georgian and 
Ukrainian returnees are faced with insurmountable difficulties in their reintegration: they find it very 
difficult to accept that their home societies have rapidly changed in their absence and, moreover, to 
accept this change internally. They have no access to almost all services and institutions, including the 
system of education and legislature, and they do not interact with their home societies. Local 
communities have very limited and distorted knowledge about the returnees’ needs and problems, 
which is largely contributed by the State’s inertia in overseeing the reintegration process. Thus except 
CBP 3-4 (economic and linguistic reintegration), Ukraine and Georgia have the lowest score (-2) 
across all other indicators. 
Azerbaijan 
Like in the Georgian case, the collapse of the Soviet Union had made Azerbaijan a new sending 
country for some time. However, the difference in economic development has recently made 
Azerbaijan a new accepting country, accepting both returnees and immigrants. 
Analyzing the current context of migration inflows to Azerbaijan, Azeri policy analysts recognize 
three migrant categories, each associated with rather imprecise incidence: (1) Azeri returnees and their 
non-Azeri families; (2) ethnic repatriants from Georgia; and (3) high-skill labour immigrants from 
overseas. Another distinct category – Azeri refugees from Nagorno- Kharabagh – is for whatever reason 
exempt from integrated political reports and is possibly merged with overall Azeri returnees. In spite of 
such categorical ambiguity and also statistical inconsistency, type number one is considered prevailing 
and devoid of fine gradations. It is therefore placed at the centre of the reintegration process.  
Another essential feature of the current context is the solar gravitation of migration inflows toward 
the Azeri capital Baku, a very specific urban space – known for its long-standing cosmopolitanism and 
regional oil industry, and thus implicating benevolent conditions for socio-economic integration. 
The state an absent actor in the integration process, while reintegration of Azeri returnees and their 
families is implemented by such alternative mechanisms as: (1) transnational networks and transnational 
spaces; (2) informal economy and corruption; and (3) extended family, in which the mother of the 
returning man protects national identities of her family members and pulls migration inflows. 
Reintegration is discursively constructed as (1) returnees’ entrepreneurship, (2) socialization in 
transnational networks and (3) family building within the framework of mother-dictated ethnic 
nationalism. The mechanism of transnational networking (often grounded in corruption and leading to 
family business) is viewed as a viable and stable replacement of the state in the reintegration process.  
The Azerbaijani case is interesting not only because of its distinction along the South Caucasian 
continuum but mainly because of the controversies within itself. Although the mean and the converted 
score are relatively high, the two major migrant groups – returnees and their families, or principal 
returning migrants and their dependent migrants – have very different blue scores: (-4) and (-17). 
Striking differences are manifested in CBP 2-4, related to their economic, linguistic and cultural 
reintegration. Thus the wives and children of the returning migrants do not speak the Azeri language, 
more frequently disagree with the local culture and its implications, and therefore experience many 
more hardships in finding appropriate employment.  
The case of Azerbaijani dependent-migrants strongly resonates with the Ukrainian case, with the 
difference that the wives of Azerbaijani returnees do not have the chance for grass-root democratic 
participation within their household (unlike returning Ukrainian women). 
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But based on the argument that the prevailing migrant group in Azerbaijan consists of Azeri 
returnees (who speak the national language, settle in the cosmopolitan city of Baku, have well-paid 
jobs in the private sector and actively engage in family-building), the migration mainstream is 
discursively constructed as homogenous, uni-directional and Baku-centred. Therefore, reintegration is 
understood as successful, although state-unsupported.  
Armenia 
Unlike its South Caucasian neighbours, Armenia has a very long history of migration and circulation, 
with return always being part of the migration cycle. The Soviet collapse and a number of consequent 
aggravating conditions [e.g.: the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the 1988 earthquake and extending 
economic crisis] had led to the emergence of the “new” Armenian diaspora, comprised of three 
distinct migration flows. The most recent migration stream within this post-Soviet diaspora is 
predominantly made of over-educated circular (but not illegal) labour-migrants, frequently rotating 
between Armenia and Russia. Thus 96% of most recent Armenian returnees have a history of 
(re)emigrating to Russia. 
In demographic terms, 70% of these migrants are married people who have children. They are 
often “astronaut” migrants4
In terms of reintegration policy-making, the 2010 Concept Paper and the 2012-2016 Action Plan 
were adopted in 2011 by the Government of the Republic of Armenia. The state and policy analysts 
clearly differentiate between returnees and migrants of the second or third generation (who comprise the 
“old” diaspora), which makes the reintegration policy more focused on the specific – prevailing - 
population. However, the overall understanding of reintegration is mostly that of “relocation” that is 
expected to be implemented in such major directions as: (1) employment [with the primary focus on 
entrepreneurship]; (2) advisory services [which seek to assist the returnees in the understanding of legal 
processes and in the solving of their residential problems]; and (3) schematic informational access and 
exchange, or Internet-based information for returnees and their e-communication with the state bodies. 
 – that is, migrants who migrate alone and have their families left in 
Armenia. In comparison with Georgia and Ukraine, these migrants have a much stronger degree of 
volunteer return, which is primarily driven by pull-factors [e.g.: homesickness or inability to reunite 
with the family in emigration]. Even the effect of such banal push-factors as Russian xenophobia and 
unacceptable social values is eventually translated into the pull of the homeland – that is, a desire to 
raise one’s children only in Armenia. 
Although the state is making an effort to steer reintegration, reintegration/relocation is in practice 
implemented by international NGOs, with the partial involvement of the Armenian Government. 
Therefore, the state is a weak (but not absent) actor. The relocation project is further associated with 
two very-limited-access “service packages”, donated by such organizations and offering a scholastic – 
though, to a certain extent, mechanic or simplistic -version of integration.  
The “narrow package” conveys the idea of consultations or informational access whereas the 
“broad package” involves some entrepreneurial sponsorship, re-skilling and re-qualification, child 
education and medical support. In this context of informational shortages and limited access, the 
processes of socio-cultural insertion and obtaining legal literacy are foremost monitored by the 
institutions of family and personal networking.  
Although rather schematic, the discursive understanding of reintegration in the country of Armenia 
is still more scrupulous and more detailed than that in Georgia. Also, the work of alternative 
mechanisms [e.g.: family, networks, international organizations], which influence the returnees’ 
resettlement, is more effective than in Georgia. However, this impact is not as strong as that in 
Azerbaijan, where the returnees’ circulation is less evident. 
                                                     
4 For “astronaut migration”, see Ong (2000) and Waters (2009). 
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Conclusion 
The Reintegration Barometer (Figure 4) shows Georgia and Ukraine at almost the same very low 
extreme. Figure 4 also displays that the best reintegration-performing country (Armenia, almost ¾ 
further ahead of Georgia/Ukraine) is actually located halfway far from the theoretical ideal of the 
European Union or from the utopian situation when all eleven Common Basic Principles would be 
evaluated as “++”. 
Four basic assumptions can be made from this general overview (which will further lead to a more 
complex discussion). The first assumption is that, except the case of Azerbaijan, the dominating 
migrant stream coming to the above-mentioned countries at the moment is comprised of returning 
(and, in many cases, illegal and circular) labour-migrants who did not spend many years abroad. 
Second, the discursive presentation of their reintegration is made in rather simplistic economic 
terms, with very little attention to the importance and complexities of socio-cultural integration.  
Third, the state is almost absent in the realization of such reintegration projects. Finally, in this 
stateless context there are alternative actors at play, which may often be powerful in the support of 
resettlement. The question to think about in the future is to what extent these alternative actors are 
efficient in promoting “stateless” reintegration. 
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Figure 1. EU Indicators and Assessment Criteria 
Quantity of 
assessment 
criteria 
in EU 
indicator 
Assessment and its meaning 
Score for 
each 
indicator 
Actors 
involved 
- Migrant 
Actors 
involved 
- State 
Actors 
involved 
- Migrant 
and State 
1 
++ Everything is done, according to the EU indicator. 2 
M1: 
 
CBP #2 
S1: 
 
CBP # 6, 8, 
10 
 
+ Something is done (maybe not completely) – integration with restrictions. 1 
- Almost nothing is done. -1 
-- Not only nothing is done, but the situation is also worsened by negative 
public attitudes. Marginalization and rejection. -2 
2 
++ Everything is done, according to the EU indicator. Both requirements for 
integration are in place. 2 
M2: 
 
CBP # 9, 3, 
4, 5 
S2: 
 
CBP #11 
MS2: 
 
CBP #7, 1 
+- Something is done: the first criterion is matched while the second is not. 0 [1+(-1)] 
-+ Something is done: the second criterion is matched while the first is not. 0 
-- Neither criterion is matched. Marginalization and rejection. -2 
4 
Adequate 
employment: 
1(+)Yes / -1(-)No 
Entrepreneurship: 
1(+)Yes / -1(-) No 
Remittances: 
1(+)Yes / -1(-) 
No 
Savings: 
1(+)Yes / -
1(-) No 
4 (++++) 
-4 (----) 
0 (+-+-) 
Etc. 
M4: 
CBP #3 
(green area) 
  
Additional 
points 
Involvement of strong (professional or other legal) networks in the mediation 
of the integration process between the migrant and the state. (This does not 
include corruption or other illegal activities, for which points are always taken 
away and which are always assessed as “-” or “--”.) 
 
0.5 
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Figure 2. Summary of EU indicators 
# Common Basic Principle of Integration (CBP) CBP basic meaning Actors Assessment 
1 Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States. Reciprocity: integration is a 2-way process. MS2 
++/+-/-+/--  
2 / 0 / 0 / -2 
2 Integration implies respect for the basic values of the EU. Respect for basic values of the host society. M1 ++ /+ / - / --  2 / 1 / -1 / -2 
3 Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible. 
Economic integration: appropriate 
employment (including visible contribution). MS1 
++/+-/-+/--  
2 / 0 / 0 / -2 
4 Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration. 
Knowledge of the language and host 
culture. M2 
++/+-/-+/--  
2 / 0 / 0 / -2 
5 Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society. Education of migrants and their children. M2 
++/+-/-+/--  
2 / 0 / 0 / -2 
6 Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration. Access to institutions and services. S1 
++ /+ / - / --  
2 / 1 / -1 / -2 
7 
Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for 
integration.  Shared forums, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and 
stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and 
Member State citizens. 
Integration (resulting in the knowledge 
about the migrant’s culture). MS2 
++/+-/-+/--  
2 / 0 / 0 / -2 
8 The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must  be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law 
Cultural diversity – the state’s protection 
of diverse cultures. S1 
++ /+ / - / --  
2 / 1 / -1 / -2 
9 The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration 
Participation in democracy and integration 
planning. M2 
++/+-/-+/--  
2 / 0 / 0 / -2 
10 Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation State governance of integration. S1 
++ /+ / - / --  
2 / 1 / -1 / -2 
11 Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective 
State planning: state involvement in 
integration management. S1 
++ /+ / - / --  
2 / 1 / -1 / -2 
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Figure 3. Post-Soviet Migration Space – Reintegration Matrix 
 CBP Meaning: 
Georgia Armenia Ukraine 
Azerbaijan  
# Key words Returning Azerbaijanis 
Families of returning 
Azerbaijanis 
 
Ethnic 
Azerbaijanis 
from Georgia 
EU Theory 
1 Reciprocity (MS2) -- [-2] +- [0] -- [-2] -+ [0] +- [0] +- [0] 2 
2 Basic values (M1) -- [-2] + [1] -- [-2] +[1] -- [-2] + [1] 2 
3 Economic: (M2) or (M4) --+- [-2] +-++ [2] --+- [-2] ++++ [4] -- [-2] -- [-2] 2 
4 Language and culture (M2) ++[2] ++ [2] ++ [2] +- [0] -- [-2] ++ [2] 2 
5 Education (M2) -+[0] ++ [2] -+ [0] -- [-2] -- [-2] -- [-2] 2 
6 Access to institutions and services (S1) -- [-2] * -- [-2] * -- [-2] -- [-2] -- [-2] -- [-2] 2 
7 Interaction (MS2) -- [-2] * ++ [2] * -- [-2] +- [0] -- [-2] -- [-2] 2 
8 Cultural diversity (S1) -- [-2] -- [-2] -- [-2] + [1] + [1] + [1] 2 
9 Participation in democracy and integration planning (M2) -- [-2] -+[0] 
+- [0] 
Family -- [-2] -- [-2] -- [-2] 2 
10 State governance (S1) -- [-2] -- [-2] -- [-2] -- [-2] -- [-2] -- [-2] 2 
11 State planning (S2) -- [-2] -- [-2] -- [-2] -- [-2] -- [-2] -- [-2] 2 
 
SCORE -16 1 -14 
-4 -17 -10 22 
Mean: (-4-17-10)/3=(-31)/3  = (-10)  
Converted score [+20] [4] [21] [6]  [10]  [42] 
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Figure 4. Reintegration Barometer  
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